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Notes

STATE'S RIGHT TO REQUIRE SUPPLEMENTAL
TRAIN PROTECTION IN VIEW OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT

In Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C.,' the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held Congress pre-empted 2 railroad safety
regulation involving requirements for the prevention of rear-end
collisions. The court, in a four-three decision, ruled section 25 of
the Interstate Commerce Act 3 precludes state regulation of flagging
1. 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358 (1968), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W.
2733 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1968) (No. 443), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3152
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1968) (No. 638), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Nov. 25,
(1968) (No. 443 and No. 638), petition for reconsiderationfiled,
U.S.L.W.
(U.S. Dec. 20, 1968) (No. 443).
2. Pre-emption is a process by which states are deprived of jurisdiction over matters embraced by federal regulation. For more detailed
discussion, see discussion of pre-emption and the police powers, infra
at p. 131.
3. 49 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), formerly § 26, as added by Transportation
Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 441, 41 Stat. 498, amended Aug. 9, 1935, ch.
498, § 1, 49 Stat. 543, Aug. 26, 1937, ch. 818, 50 Stat. 835, renumbered Sept.
18, 1940, ch. 722, title I, § 14(b), 54 Stat. 919. Section 25 of the Interstate
Commerce Act [hereinafter referred to as section 25] provides in part as
follows:
(b) Order to install systems, etc.; modification; negligence of
carrier
The Commission may, after investigation, if found necessary in
the public interest, order any carrier within a time specified in the
order, to install the block signal system, interlocking, automatic
train stop, train control, and/or cab-signal devices and/or other
similar appliances, methods, and systems intended to promote the
safety of railroad operation which comply with specifications and
requirements prescribed by the Commission, upon the whole or
any part of its railroad such order to be issued and published a
reasonable time (as determined by the Commission) in advance of
the date for its fulfillment: Provided, That block signal systems
interlocking, automatic train stop, train control, and cab-signal
devices in use on August 26, 1937, or such systems or devices
hereinafter installed may not be discontinued or materially modi-
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protection. 4 The Bessemer decision is contrary to the interpretation adopted by courts of other states concerning the effect section
25 has upon a state's right to prescribe measures intended to promote increased railroad safety. 5 One year prior to the Pennsylvania decision in Bessemer, the identical issue was litigated in New
Jersey. There the New Jersey Supreme Court decided section 25
6
does not preclude a state from requiring flagging protection. This
Note will analyze the Bessemer decision and evaluate its soundness
in light of the general principles of pre-emption and the legislative
history, interpretation, and use of section 25.
fied by carriers without the approval of the Commission....
Filing report on rules, standards, and instructions with Com(c)
mission; time; modification
Each carrier by railroad shall file with the Commission its rules,
standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of the systems, devices, and appliances covered
by this section within six months after August 26, 1937, and, after
approval by the Commission, such rules, standards, and instructions, with such modifications as the Commission may require,
shall become obligatory upon the carrier: Provided, however,
That if any such carrier shall fail to file its rules, standards, and
instructions the Commission shall prepare rules, standards, and
instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of such systems, devices, and appliances to be observed by
such carrier, which rules, standards, and instructions, a copy
thereof having been served on the president, chief operating officer, trustee, or receiver, of such carrier, shall be obligatory:
Provided further, That such carrier may from time to time change
the rules, standards, and instructions herein provided for, but such
change shall not take effect and the new rules, standards, and instructions be enforced until they shall have been filed with and
approved by the Commission: And provided further, That the
Commission may on its own motion, upon good cause shown, revise, amend, or modify the rules, standards, and instructions prescribed by it under this subsection, and as revised, amended, or
modified they shall have been served as above provided.
4. Flagging protection is an emergency warning process used to prevent approaching trains from colliding with stationary trains on the same
track. A flagman positions himself a sufficient distance behind the halted
train and, by the use of torpedoes, fusees, and a red flag or lantern, provides warning to an approaching train that the track ahead is not clear.
This early warning allows the approaching engineer sufficient distance to
stop his train without a collision.
5. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n., 18 Ill.
2d 506, 165 N.E.2d 322 (1960); In re Complaint of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen
v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs., 49 N.J. 174, 229 A.2d 505 (1967); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Department of Pub. Util., 14 N.J. 411, 102 A.2d 618 (1954).
6. In re Complaint of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Board of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs., 49 N.J. 174, 229 A.2d 505 (1967); accord, Pennsylvania R.R. v.
See also
Department of Pub. Util., 14 N.J. 411, 102 A.2d 618 (1954).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 248 Md. 580, 238
A.2d 516 (1968) where the Maryland Court of Appeals, without discussing
the issue of pre-emption, decided a Public Service Commission order requiring flagging on railroad tracks governed by automatic block signal
systems was unnecessary and unsupported by evidence.

CASE HISTORY
Railroads have had an operating rule, usually "Rule 99,"'7 which

requires a member of the crew to provide flagging protection a
sufficient distance behind trains which are stopped under circumstances in which they may be overtaken by other trains. In April,
1964, some railroads in Pennsylvania instituted programs to eliminate the application of flag protection rules to trains operating
under rules governing locomotive cab signals and automatic and
8
manual block signals.
7. The most common version of Rule 99 in existence prior to 1964

provided in pertinent part as follows:
When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, a member of the crew must go back immediately with flagging equipment a sufficient distance to insure
full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in
addition, displaying lighted fusees.
See Supplemental Record at 219c-292c, Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 210 Pa. Super. 7, 232 A.2d 220 (1967).
8. The following systems and methods of train-spacing will be
mentioned throughout this Note:
Automatic train control system. A system so arranged that its operation
will automatically result in the following:
a. A full application of the train brakes which will continue either
until the train is brought to a stop, or, under control of the engineman,
its speed is reduced to a predetermined rate.
b. When operating under a speed restriction, an application of the
brakes when the speed of the train exceeds the predetermined rate
which will continue until the speed is reduced to the predetermined
rate. 49 C.F.R. § 236.835 (1968).
Automatic train stop system. A system so arranged that its operation
will automatically result in the application of the brakes until the train has
been brought to a stop. 49 C.F.R. § 236.836 (1968).
Interlocking. An arrangement of signals and signal appliances so
interconnected that train movements must succeed each other in proper
sequence, train movements over all routes being governed by signal indication. 49 C.F.R. § 236.751 (1968). Interlocking is used where separate
tracks join or cross. It may be operated manually or automatically.
Automatic block signal system. A system in which the line of track
is divided into lengths called blocks. The traffic in each block is controlled by a signal called a block signal, located at the entrance to the
block. These signals indicate stop, approach, or clear, depending upon
whether the block being approached is occupied, the block after the one
being approached is occupied, or both are clear. Railroad operating rules
govern speed limits within blocks depending upon the signal at the entrance to the block. In an automatic block system the signals are activated automatically through electric currents in the track.
Manual block signal system. This system is designed the same as the
automatic block system except that the signals are operated manually by
signalmen rather than by electric currents.
Locomotive cab signal system. A system in which the engine cab
contains a panel displaying in minature the same signal which is displayed on the wayside block signal. In this system the engineer is constantly reminded of the signal presented upon entering the block and
informed of changing traffic conditions in the block ahead.
Timetables. This is a method of operation in which signals are not
used. The engineer uses a table which lists times at which he is to pass
designated points. The table is set up so that trains should be separated
by an interval of time.
Train orders. Train orders are used in conjunction with time tables
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In July, 1964, the Co-operative Legislative Committee of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, acting through three of its
members, filed a complaint 9 before the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission. " The complaint, against the Pittsburgh and
Lake Erie Railroad, alleged that the elimination of flagging under
automatic block and other mechanical signal systems resulted in
unsafe warning procedures. As relief, the complainants requested
the P.U.C. to order the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie to re-instate adequate flag protection throughout its system in Pennsylvania. In October, 1964, the Brotherhoods Committee filed a petition 1 with the
P.U.C. and served it on all railroads operating in Pennsylvania. The
petition claimed that all the mechanical signal systems, where flag
protection had been eliminated, were signal systems in which trains
could be overtaken by following trains. Accordingly, it asked the
P.U.C. to promulgate a regulation requiring flagging protection
in Pennsylvania regardless of the other signal systems being used.
After extensive hearings the P.U.C. found that elimination of
flag protection jeopardized the safety of the public and railroad
employees; therefore, flag protection augmenting that furnished
by other signals was deemed essential.1 2 The P.U.C. issued separate orders dated November 22, 1965, requiring that all railroads
operating in Pennsylvania promulgate rules providing for flag protection.13 To eliminate difficulty in interpreting these orders, the
P.U.C. held further hearings and issued an amended order on December 19, 1965.14 This amended order required the railroads
or other systems. Written orders inform the engineer of speeds, arrival
times, intervals, obstacles, etc. The orders are given to the engineers at
station stops. The engineer operates his train according to instructions
given in the train order.
9. Complaint of Co-Operative Legislative Comm., R.R. Bhds. v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., Complaint Docket No. 18018 (P.U.C., filed July 22, 1964).
10. Hereinafter referred to as P.U.C.
11. Petition of Co-Operative Legislative Comm., R.R. Bhds., Petition
Docket No. 7 (P.U.C., filed Oct. 26, 1964).
12. In re Petition of Co-Operative Legislative Comm., R.R. Bhds., 42
P.U.C. 506, 517 (1965).
13. In re Petition of Co-Operative Legislative Comm., R.R. Bhds.,
42 P.U.C. 506, 517-518 (1965); Co-Operative Legislative Comm. v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., Complaint Docket No. 18018 (P.U.C., Nov. 22, 1965).
14. In re Petition of Co-Operative Legislative Comm., R.R. Bhds.
Petition Docket No. 7 (P.U.C., Dec. 22, 1966). The amended order provides in part as follows:
3. That all railroads operating in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, within 45 days of service hereof, promulgate appropriate
operating rules and special instructions for the government of their
respective employees in conformity with the following:
(a) When a train stops under circumstances in which it may
be overtaken by another train, a member of the crew must pro-

to re-instate flagging protection to virtually the same extent as
it had been required under operating "Rule 99."
The railroads appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 15
They contended, among other things, that the order issued by the
P.U.C. was unlawful because railroad operation in block signal
territory, including flag protection, is subject to regulation by the
I.C.C.16 The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the order of the
P.U.C.17
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur limiting
argument to the issue of pre-emption.18 The railroads contended
that Congress, by enacting section 25, conferred upon the I.C.C.
specific powers to establish the requirements necessary for safe
operation under all methods and systems of signaling, including
the power to require flag or other supplementary protection;
further, that the I.C.C. had exercised its power under section 25
to require flag protection where deemed necessary in conjunction
with such methods or systems of signaling.' 9 The P.U.C. and Railroad Brotherhoods contended that Congress did not, by the passage
of section 25, manifest an intention to preclude the states from
requiring flagging protection of trains against following move20
ments.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that federal legislation
had pre-empted state intervention in the protection of trains against
following trains.21 The court based its holding on its interpretation
of the general law of pre-emption, the language of section 25, and
the identity of function performed by flagging and other mechanical signaling devices. Justice Musmanno dissented, discussing the
need or flagging protection and citing several United States Supreme Court case holdings regarding pre-emption. 22 Justice Covide flagging protection, that is, go back immediately with a red
flag, torpedoes and fusees by day and with a red and/or white
light, torpedoes, and fusees by night, a sufficient distance to in-

sure full protection, placing two torpedoes on the rail and when
necessary, in addition, display lighted fusees.
(b) When recalled and safety to the train will permit, he may
return.
15. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C, 210 Pa. Super. 7,
232 A.2d 220 (1967), rev'd, 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358 (1968).
16. Brief for Appellant at 9, Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania
P.U.C., 210 Pa. Super. 7, 232 A.2d 220 (1967).
17. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 210 Pa. Super. 7,
232 A.2d 220 (1967), rev'd, 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358 (1968).
18. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d
358 (1968).
19. Brief for Appellant at 13, 32, Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania
P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358 (1968).
20. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 1, Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v.
Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358 (1968); Brief for Intervening
Appellee at 3, Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339,
243"A.2d 358 (1968).
21. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 243
A.2d 358 (1968).
22. Id. at 348, 243 A.2d at 362.
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hen and Justice Eagen dissented separately, analyzing the language
23
of section 25 and citing the contrary New Jersey case.
PRE-EMPTION AND THE POLICE POWERS

Each state, in granting authority to the federal government,
reserved the right to regulate local matters concerning the health
and safety of its citizens. 24 The traditional control over matters of
local concern is labeled the police power of the state. In the absence
of conflicting legislation by Congress, this reservation of state
power may extend into areas of interstate commerce. 2 A state
may in the exercise of its police power incidentally affect interstate commerce. 26 A state cannot, however, burden the free flow
27
of interstate commerce.
Congress, in exercising its authority over interstate commerce,
may act either exclusively or concurrently with the states. 28 When
Congress makes its regulation exclusive, pre-emption results.2 All
state action covering the same subject matter is superseded. By
virtue of power properly delegated by Congress, the same result
follows from regulation by federal commissions or agencies such
as the I.C.C. "°
Pre-emption is the product not of the mere passage of federal

legislation but of a congressional intention or purpose that the
23. Id. at 360, 243 A.2d at 368.
24. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Boston &
M.R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932); New Mexico ex rel. McLean v.
Denver & R.G.R.R., 203 U.S. 38 (1906); New York N.H. & H.R.R. v. New
York, 165 U.S 628 (1897); Patterson v Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878).
25. E.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725 (1949); Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
Parker v Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,
315 U.S. 148 (1942); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 19 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
26. E.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Southern Pac.
R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943);
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
27. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 341 U.S. 329 (1951);
Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see H.P. Hood & Sons
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
28. E.g. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Pearce
v. Freeman, 238 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1965)
29. See cases cited, infra note 31.
30. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Chicago, 240 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 77 (1958).

federal law shall be exclusive.-" This intention or purpose may
be either express or implied. Where the language employed in the
federal statute is so plain and unambiguous that the congressional
intention to pre-empt is obvious, the federal exclusion of state law
is inescapable. 2 Where the statute is not clear, however, a more
detailed inquiry into the operation, meaning and effect of the
statute is necessary. General rules of statutory interpretation such
as consideration of the legislative history of the act, the particular
purpose of the
circumstances which motivated its passage, and the
3
act are helpful in determining congressional intent.
When Congress acts in an area traditionally within the state
police power the question of pre-emption becomes difficult. There
is an assumption that state regulation protecting the health and
safety of its citizens is not superseded in the absence of clearly
shown congressional intent.34 Because of this assumption, a congressional intention to pre-empt a state's police power should not
be inferred without substantial reason.3 5
Certain helpful tests for the determination of pre-emptive intent can be extracted from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. They are the coincidence test, the scope test, the
conflict test, and the operation test. Each of these tests will be
discussed separately.
The coincidence test deals with the subject matter with which
the concurrent statutes are concerned. If the federal statute covers
the precise subject matter as the state regulation, pre-emption may
be inferred.26 It is not sufficient that the congressional enactment
invades the same field;3 7 it must regulate the precise subject mat31. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945).
32. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); New York Cent. R.R. v.
Lefkowitz, 259 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1965).
33. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966); F.P.C. v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 376 U.S.
205 (1964); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n. v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963);
see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 729 (1949); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1
(1937). See generally A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 365 (1950).
34. E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); AllenBradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942).
35. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).

36. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132

(1963); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Missouri K.T. Ry. v. Harris,
234 U.S. 412 (1914). Contra,California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
37. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); see Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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ter. Although the coincidence test was formerly considered a mechanical formula to determine the exclusiveness of federal regulation, it has recently lost this determinative quality and become
only one of several tests used to discover congressional intent.38
This effect has probably been caused largely by the tremendous
increase in federal regulation enacted since 1930.
Closely associated with the coincidence test is a test provided
by an examination of the scope of the federal regulation. Congress
may determine how far its regulation of interstate commerce shall
go. If the federal regulation be sufficiently pervasive, there may be
an inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.39 Conversely, Congress may circumscribe its regulation
and occupy only a limited field. When this occurs, state action or
40
regulation outside that limited field is not forbidden or replaced.
Likewise, the effect of statutes conferring broad powers upon federal agencies may need to be interpreted in accordance with the
41
use these agencies make of their powers.
The conflict test concerns the wording of the statutes. If it is
clear that the state provisions are inconsistent with those of the
federal government, pre-emption is inferrable. 42 The repugnance
must be direct and positive so that the two acts cannot be recon43
ciled or consistently stand together.
The final test can be called the operation test. It is concerned
with the operation of the statutes. If the state statute operates to
frustrate the purpose for which the federal law was enacted, pre38. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949).
39. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
40. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 341 U.S. 329 (1951);
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); South Carolina
Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937).
41. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U.S.
767 (1947); cf. Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Kenosha
Motor Coach Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 254 Wis. 509, 37 N.E.2d 78,
appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
42. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); California v. Zook, 326 U.S. 725 (1949); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,
315 U.S. 148 (1942); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Atchison T. &
S.F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n., 283 U.S. 380 (1931); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501 (1912).
43. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); California v. Taylor,
353 U.S. 553 (1957).

emptive intention will be inferred. 44 The operation test is probably the most effective and current method of determining the
existence of pre-emption by inference.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that it
is a perplexing problem to determine whether Congress by its
action has precluded state regulation or has left the state police
power undisturbed. 45 Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. 46
All tests are applied collectively to derive congressional intention
47
and no one test is considered determinative.
HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF SIGNALING

Federal attention first became directed toward the need for
improvements in train spacing after the passage of the Accident
Reports Act of 1901.48 On the basis of the first full year of accident
reports, the I.C.C. began to stress the need for prevention of collisions by increased use of automatic and manual block signal systems.49 The I.C.C. recommended that congressional action be
taken to overcome the hesitancy of the railroads to assume the
added expense of installing these systems. 50 The first congressional response came in the Block Signal Resolution of June 30,
1906. 51 This joint resolution directed the I.C.C. to investigate the
necessity for block signal systems and appliances for automatic
control of railway trains. Upon completion of its investigation the
I.C.C. was to recommend advisable legislation to Congress.52 After
four years of investigation the I.C.C. recommended that Congress
enact legislation requiring the use of the block system on all
passenger lines.5" Congress failed to act.
44. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
773 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); cf. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
45. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
46. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
47. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949). See generally Anderson, State Regulation of Interstate Commerce, 61 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1956);
A Symposium on Statutory Construction,3 VAND. L. REV. 365 (1950).
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 866, 31 Stat. 1446.
49. See 16 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 66-67 (1902). This early I.C.C. pressure
received little congressional attention, and the I.C.C. continued its efforts
in the ensuing years. See 18 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 98-102 (1904); 17 I.C.C.
ANN. REP. 102-107 (1903).
50. See 16 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 68 (1902).
51. Pub. Res., No. 46, 34 Stat. 838.
52. In co-operation with the American Railway Association, a body
of experts known as the Block Signal and Train Control Board was organized to conduct the experimentation. See 21 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 122-126
(1907). The board conducted tests for a period of four years and recommended the compulsory use of block signals on all passenger lines. The
I.C.C. submitted these recommendations to Congress. See 25 I.C.C. ANN.
REP. 85-87 (1911).
53. See 25 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 85-87 (1911).
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On the basis of repeated disclosures concerning the primary
causes of accidents, the I.C.C. discovered that the failure of engineers to observe and obey signal indications constituted one of the
main causes.14 It became apparent that, in addition to the use of
the block system, the installation of automatic train control devices
was necessary. Accordingly, in 1919 the I.C.C. altered its recommendation to Congress to include the need for legislation covering
automatic train control devices. 5
Congress acted on I.C.C. requests by including mechanical
train-spacing provisions in the Transportation Act of 1920. 5 Section 441 of the Transportation Act added section 26 to the Interstate
Commerce Act.57 Under section 26 the I.C.C. was given authority
to require railroads "to install automatic train-stop or train-control
devices or other safety devices."58 The inclusion of the general
clause, "other safety devices," presented a question: What was
to be its effect upon the scope of I.C.C. authority? The I.C.C.
evidently did not interpret it as adding substantially to the express
authority granted by the preceding words because no installations
other than train stop and train control devices were ordered.5"
Any doubt as to the effect of the clause was removed by the Supreme Court of the United States when it affirmed per curiam60
the decision of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in International54. See 33 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 46 (1919).
55. 33 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 46 (1919). The altered recommendation was
as follows:
The only remedy proposed which appears to be adequate to check
and provide protection against occurrence of disastrous accidents of
this character is the adoption of some form of automatic traincontrol system for the purpose of compelling obedience to automatic block-signal indications.
56. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 441, 41 Stat. 498.
57. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended 49 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1964). Section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act [hereinafter referred to as section 26] as added by the Transportation Act of Feb. 28,
1920, ch. 91, § 441, 41 Stat. 498, provided in part as follows:
That the Commission [I.C.C.] may, after investigation, order any
carrier by railroad subject to this part, within a time specified in
the order to install automatic train-stop or train-control devices or
other safety devices, which comply with specifications and requirements prescribed by the Commission, upon the whole or any
part of its railroad, such order to be issued and published at least
two years before the date specified for its fulfillment....
58. Section 26.
59. See Automatic Train Control Devices, 91 I.C.C. 426 (1924); Automatic Train Control Devices, 69 I.C.C. 258 (1922); 43 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 38-43
(1929); 42 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 37-39 (1928); 41 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 43-48
(1927); 40 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 5-12 (1926); 39 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 8-13 (1925);

38 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 8-12 (1924).
60. International-Great Northern R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n., 275 U.S.
503 (1927).

Great Northern R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n. 61 In that case International-Great Northern brought an action to have the court declare
void commission orders requiring the railroad, along with two other
railroads, to install interlocking devices at points where their lines
intersected in the city of Houston. International-Great Northern
contended that section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act preempted the state's power to require installation of interlocking
devices. In deciding that section 26 had no effect upon the state's
right to require interlocking, the Texas court said:
The section, in our judgment, refers to automatic train
stops or train control devices in use for the prevention of
collision between trains on the same track. Apparently
that is the construction given the language by the railroads.
It is also apparently the construction placed upon it by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, for, in carrying out its
provisions, that body had only prescribed and promulgated
"specifications and requirements" with respect to automatic
stops or train control devices, which in no way relate to
safety devices for intersecting railroad grade crossings. So
we conclude that neither the Transportation Act of 1920,
nor any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
pursuant to its enforcement, has deprived this state of its
right in the exercise of its police power to regulate grade
crossings of 02Texas railroad corporations as effecting the
public safety.
The opinion of the Texas court, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, makes it clear that the grant of authority to the I.C.C.
extends no further than the mechanical devices specifically listed.
The circumscribed powers of the I.C.C. under the interpretations of section 26 proved to be of little benefit in the prevention
of collisions by mechanical train-spacing devices. In its accident
reports, the I.C.C. Bureau of Safety repeatedly attributed causation
to the failure of the railroads to make adequate use of the block
system.63 Because of the lack of authority over this type of signaling, the I.C.C. could do no more than recommend to the railroads
that they install block signal systems. The Bureau reports received notice by the 74th Congress in 1935. In that year a bill was
introduced to increase the section 26 authority of the I.C.C. to include jurisdiction over the installation of block signal systems and
other named mechanical devices.6 4 The proposed bill, however,
was not passed during the 74th Congress.
61. 281 S.W. 1084 (Tex. 1926).
62. Id. at 1086.
63. See Hearings on S. 1288 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 5 (1935).
64. S. 1288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). (A Bill to promote the safety
of employees and travelers on railroads by requiring common carriers
engaged in interstate commerce to install, inspect, test, repair and maintain
block-signal systems, interlocking, highway grade-crossing protective devices, automatic train-stop, train control, cab signal devices, and other
appliances, methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of rail-
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The bill which resulted in the amendment of section 26 to the
present form of section 25 was introduced in both Houses during
the 75th Congress.65 The bill proposed to extend the I.C.C. jurisdiction to include the installation, inspection, repair, and maintenance of block signal systems, interlocking, automatic train stop,
train control, and cab signal devices, and other appliances, methods,
and systems intended to promote railroad safety. A hearing entitled Block-Signal Systems, was held before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.66 The unsatisfactory effect
of complete reliance on automatic train control and train stop
devices was discussed. 67 The need for I.C.C. authority over the
regulation of block signals was the dominant subject. In addition,
the proponents of the bill emphasized the importance of the proposed provisions granting the I.C.C. authority to regulate the
maintenance of signals.68 Throughout the entire hearing the subroad operation.)
A hearing on the bill was conducted before the Senate Subcommittee
on Interstate Commerce. The scope of the hearing indicates that the
main purpose of the bill was to give the I.C.C. power to regulate the named

devices, most importantly blocksignal systems. No mention was made

of the intent of the phrase "and other appliances, methods, and systems in-

tended to promote railroad safety." Neither was any mention made of the
inclusion of flagging protection within the authority intended to be granted
by the bill. Hearings on S. 1288 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14 (1935).
65. S. 29, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 185, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935).
66. Hearings on H.R. 185 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4 (1937).
67. Id. at 20. The following is an excerpt from the hearing:
Mr. Martin [Representative from Colorado]: Mr. Lyon, it seems to
me that I recollect that in the hearings before the subcommittee
some testimony was given-I do not know by whom-to the effect that these automatic train stops have not worked very satisfactorily, and that the law in that regard, to a large extent, has
fallen into disuse, and the device had been permitted to be taken
out in some cases where it had been installed, and that that feature of the law is now not operative to any considerable extent; is
that true?
Mr. Lyon [President, Railway Signalmen of America]: That has
occurred on a number of occasions. There are a number of occasions where the railroads have made formal petition to the Interstate Commerce Commission asking for authority to discontinue the
use of automatic train-stop equipment, which the Commission had
previously ordered them to use. The Commission held hearings
and in some cases has permitted the railroads to take that equipment out largely because of decreased traffic conditions or other
conditions, probably changes since the equipment was first installed years ago, but the law has been in full force and has been
lived up to.
68. Hearings on H.R. 185 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 20 (1937). The following is an excerpt from the hearing:

ject of flagging was never discussed as a signal system which would
be regulated by the proposed law.
Flagging, to have been considered as one of the signal systems
covered by the bill, would have been included within the general
clause, "other appliances, methods, and systems intended to promote railroad safety." However, the only discussion offered as to
the meaning of the general clause indicated that it was to include
future developments in train-spacing devices rather than supplemental warning procedures in use at the time of the bill.69 Flagging, a supplemental warning procedure, would not have been included.
In reporting on the bill, the I.C.C. Legislative Committee
recommended to both the House and Senate Committees that the
word "similar" be inserted in the general clause between the words
"other" and "appliances, methods, and systems."70 The committee
reasoned that, in the absence of the word "similar," the clause
would have a broader meaning than was intended by the bill.
Likewise, the Legislative Committee recommended the word "methods" in the proposed general clause be eliminated "as the preceding
words installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair hardly fit
methods.""
This would indicate that the I.C.C. interpreted the
amendment to give it authority over only mechanical devices which
could be installed, inspected, maintained, and repaired.
In reporting to the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce included the following statement
concerning the purpose of the bill:
The purpose of the bill is to extend the authority of
Mr. Lyon: [President, Railway Signalmen of America]: Of course,
the bill goes beyond that. Section 26 covers authority of the Commission [I.C.C.] to order them [the railroad companies] to install
train control, and the important part of the bill is something entirely different, and that is the establishing of safety standards
for the maintenance of signal equipment. We are not concerned
so much about the Commission's authority to have the equipment
put in, but about having it taken care of properly after it is
installed.
69. Hearings on H.R. 185 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 15 (1937). The following is an excerpt from the hearing:
Mr. Martin [Representative from Colorado]: Now, if we assume
that highway grade-crossing protective devices are going out of the
bill, and the automatic train-stop and train control are now under
the law, it would leave as new matter the block-signal system,
interlocking, and cab-signal devices, is that not right?
Mr. Lyon [President, Railway Signalmen of America]: Yes; and
other similar devices, and so on as mentioned.
Mr. Martin: Yes.
Mr. Lyon: That term "similar appliances" would include those
new developments taking place right along. We are making new
signal devices that are given a different name now and then,
such as centralized traffic control, a recent development.
70. Hearings on H.R. 185 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 4, at 4 (1937).
71. Id. at 5.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission in respect to safety
devices so as to include block-signal devices and systems.
The section of the Interstate Commerce Act relating to
automatic train control devices would be so amended as to
make like provision in regard to all types of signaling
apparatus
used for the promotion of safety of railroad oper72
ation.
This statement of purpose was consistent with the tone of the hearings. Both indicated the main reason for the proposal was to
grant to the I.C.C. authority over block signal systems.
The bill passed both Houses and was enacted on August 26,
1937. With its passage section 26 was amended to the present
language of section 25. In 1940 section 26 was renumbered section
25. 73 Nowhere throughout the legislative history of this act was
flagging mentioned as a method of signaling to be included within
I.C.C. jurisdiction. The I.C.C. in administering section 25 has never
interpreted it as granting federal jurisdiction over regulation of
flagging.14
THE MAJORITY OPINION IN BESSEMER

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania gave three reasons for its
determination that section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act preempts the state's police power in the field of flag protection.7 5
First, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the mechanical devices specifically required by § 25 perform the
exact same function that manual flagging is intended to
perform. . . ; second, the language used in § 25 is broad
enough to indicate that Congress has chosen to regulate
the entire field of rear end collision prevention; and third,
the Supreme Court of the United States has announced
the rule that where federal language is broad enough to
indicate pre-emption, a state law cannot escape interdiction
on the ground that it does76 not conflict with the federal
regulations actually passed.
Each of these reasons will be separately analyzed.
A. Exact Same Function
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the mechanical de72. H.R. Rep. No. 185, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). Virtually the
same statement of purpose appears in the report of the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce. S. Rep. No. 245, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937).
73. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, title I, § 14 (b), 54 Stat. 919.
74. See discussion of letters written by I.C.C. General Counsel denying
I.C.C. jurisdiction over flagging, infra note 93.
75. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 343, 243
A.2d 358, 360 (1968).
76. Id.

vices listed in section 25 perform the "exact same function" as
flagging protection. The court relied on this observation as demonstrative that Congress intended by passage of section 25 to pre-empt
the state's right to regulate flagging protection.
In examining the functions of the mechanical devices specifically listed in section 25, the block signal system, interlocking,
automatic train stop, train control, and cab signals, it is apparent
that each is designed to space trains at proper intervals so that
they operate without coming in contact with other trains on the
same track. 77 This is also the function of train orders and timetables which were the original methods of spacing and which are
still in use on portions of trackage not controlled by mechanical
devices. 78 Flagging differs from all these devices and systems.70
The purpose of flagging is to provide a supplemental emergency
warning of the presence of a stopped train when, because of some
failure of the spacing devices, the interval is not maintained. Because of the rapid speed of modern trains it is often impossible for
them to stop within the distance remaining when they notice a
stopped train occupying the track ahead. The presence of a flagman a sufficient distance behind the train gives the approaching
train enough advance warning that it can complete its stop without
a collision. It is train orders and timetables, not flagging, which
modern mechanical signal devices replace.80 In light of this distinction between flagging and the mechanical devices listed in section 25, it is questionable whether Congress has covered the precise
subject matter of the P.U.C. order.
Even if it were assumed that section 25 and the P.U.C. order did
perform the same function, that alone would not necessarily be a
legitimate reason for assuming that Congress has precluded the
states from regulating flagging. The coincidence test is only one
method for determining pre-emptive intent. There are United
States Supreme Court decisions in which state statutes that perform the "exact same function" as federal acts or supplement federal legislation have been upheld. 8' One reason advanced by the
77. See descriptions, supra note 8
78. See descriptions, supra note 8.
79. Compare descriptions, supra note 8, with description, supra note 4.
80. Hearings on S. 1288 Before the Senate Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 4 (1935).
The

following is an excerpt from the hearing:

Mr. Lyon [Acting Grand President, Railway Signalmen of America]: The trend in railroading is very definitely toward elimination of the written train order and placing dependence for safe
train operation upon signal indications.
81. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); see, e.g., Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 341 U.S. 329 (1951); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); cf. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Corn Products v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
But see Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'rs., 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
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Supreme Court for leniency in permitting this dual regulation
has been the fear of creating twilight zones where neither the states
nor the federal government would act. 2 This reason is particularly
applicable to the Bessemer case. At the time section 25 was enacted, the railroads were almost universally providing the rules for
flag protection. Consequently, between 1937 and 1964, it was not
necessary to require flagging by either federal or state action, and
no governmental rules were adopted. Hence, when the railroads
eliminated their practice, the field was left open, and the P.U.C.
stepped in to fill the void. If the P.U.C. had not acted, the area
would have remained unregulated.
Another reason advanced for permitting dual regulation is the
varying acuteness of the problem. In California v. Zook"' a state
statute 4 prohibited the sale or arrangement of any transportation
over public highways of the state if the transporting carrier had
no permit from the I.C.C. The federal Motor Carrier Act 85 had
precisely the same provision. In upholding the state law against a
claim of pre-emption the United States Supreme Court said,
"[c] oincidence of the subject matter of the laws is only one factor
to be considered in determining the pre-emption question."80 In
the absence of a clear manifestation of congressional intention to
displace local laws or an inconsistency in the terms of the laws, the
coincidence of subject matter is of little consequence in respect to
laws imbued with the state's interests. The majority decided that
a problem which varies in degree with its situs is essentially local in
nature. They reasoned that, in localities where the problem is acute,
local regulation supplementing federal law is beneficial. The Supreme Court held Congress would not have intended to preclude
local regulation by making federal law exclusive.
The local conditions under which railroads operate vary greatly
among the states. Curvature, gradage, and repair of tracks vary
with the locality of operation. Differences in visibility caused by
landscape, foliage, and atmosphere are present. Varying weather
conditions change stopping distances. The frequency of obstructions found on the rails is a matter local in nature. All these con82.

See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.

Comm'n., 341 U.S. 329 (1951).
83. 336 U.S. 725 (1949); see cases cited supra note 81.
84.

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 654.1, 654.3 (West 1955).

The statute makes

it a criminal offense to sell transportation in a carrier which has failed to
secure a permit from either the California Public Utilities Commission or
the I.C.C.
85. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, pt. II, § 203, as added by Act of Aug. 9,
1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 544, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 303(c) (1964).

86.

336 U.S. at 730.

ditions affect the requirements of flagging protection. Diversity of
requirements make flagging a problem of varying acuteness and
demonstrate the necessity for local regulation.
B.

Broad FederalLanguage

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the language in
section 25 permitting the I.C.C. to require "other similar appliances,
methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of railroad
operation . . ." to show that the I.C.C. has the power to require
flag protection. 7 Reference has already been made to the interpretation given by the I.C.C. and the United States Supreme Court
of the even broader general clause found in the predecessor of the
present section 25.88 Both the I.C.C. and the Supreme Court decided it added nothing to the expressed powers conveyed. Reference has also been made to the legislative history, including the
committee hearings and reports, concerning the present section
25.89 The legislative history shows the addition of the block signal
to the I.C.C. authority was the prime purpose of the legislation
and flagging was not a topic of inclusion. The report and recommendations of the I.C.C. Legislative Committee concerning the elimination of the word "methods" from the present general clause
presents a forceful indication that the I.C.C. did not intend to
acquire jurisdiction over anything other than mechanical devices.
By analyzing the language of section 25, as Justice Cohen did
in his dissent, one can easily arrive at the conclusion that it intends
to embrace only mechanical devices. Subsection (b) provides in
part as follows:
(b) The Commission may . . . order any carrier . . . to
install the block signal system, interlocking, automatic
train stop, train control, and/or cab signal devices, and/or
other similar appliances, methods and systems . . . upon
the whole or any part of its railroad. ....
The use of the word "install" makes it apparent that only mechanical devices were intended to be included.
.0

The Pennsylvania court cited Order No. 29543 issued pursuant
to Appliances, Methods, and Systems Intended to Promote Safety
of Railroad Operation91 as an indication that the I.C.C. has author87. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v.
A.2d 358, 360 (1968).
88. See text accompanying
89. See text accompanying
90. 49 U.S.C. § 26(b) (1964)

91. 268 I.C.C. 547 (1947).

Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 344, 243
notes 59-62 supra.
notes 65-74 supra.
(emphasis added).

The order provides in part that all class I

and all switching railroads are to:
1. Install on that part or parts of its lines over which any
passenger train is operated at a speed of 60 or more miles per

hour, or any freight train is operated at a speed of 50 or more miles

per hour, an automatic block-signal system which shall conform to
the rules, standards, and instructions prescribed by the order of
the Commission [I.C.C.] of April 13, 1939, as herein amended, or a
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ity to regulate flagging and has exercised this authority. Both the
I.C.C. and the Department of Transportation 92 have interpreted the
meaning of Order No. 29543, and both have stated it should not be
construed as an exercise of jurisdiction over flag protection. 93
These interpretations are significant in light of the fact that courts
frequently give great weight to I.C.C. interpretations of its
94
powers.
manual block system which shall conform to the following conditions:
A passenger train will not be permitted to enter the block when
occupied by another train, except under flag protection; no train
will be admitted to the block when occupied by an opposing
train or by a passenger train, except under flag protection; and
a train other than a passenger train will not be permitted to follow a train other than a passenger train into the block except
when authorized by a train order, permissive signal, or prescribed
form, and when such movement is so authorized, the following
train must proceed prepared to stop short of a train or obstruction, but not to exceed 15 miles per hour.
92. On April 1, 1967, all railroad safety regulations formerly administered by the I.C.C. were placed under the aegis of the Department of
Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration [hereinafter referred to
as D.O.T.].
93. During the preparation of their appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supe rior Court, counsel for the P.U.C. corresponded with the I.C.C. regarding the I.C.C. interpretation of section 25. Letter from Louis C. Carter,
Assistant Counsel, P.U.C., to Robert W. Ginnane, General Counsel, I.C.C.,
Feb. 8, 1967. In response, the I.C.C. stated:
While Congress has enacted several laws relating to railroad
safety, none relates to the protection of trains by flag. This Commission has never formally construed Section 25 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S. Code 26, as including such flag protection.
Letter from Robert W. Ginnane to Louis C. Carter, Feb. 20, 1967.
Later, during preparation for its appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, counsel for appellant-railroad brought Order No. 29543 to the attention of the I.C.C. Letter from Richard N. Clattenburg, General Attorney,
Pennsylvania Railroad, to Robert W. Ginnane, June 27, 1967. In correspondence which followed from both the I.C.C. and D.O.T. it was stated
that Order No. 29543 should not be construed as an exercise of jurisdiction
over flag protection. The General Counsel for the I.C.C. wrote:
While Order No. 29543 provided for movement of trains in an
occupied block subject to flag protection, this was considered a
permissive requirement to allow such movements. The Commission had not construed its action as including flagging as one of
the safety appliances, methods, or systems covered by Section 25
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Letter from Robert W. Ginnane to Richard N. Clattenburg, July 12, 1967.
The Acting Director, Bureau of Railroad Safety, D.O.T., wrote, "The
manner in which flag protection is provided is an operating matter over
which we do not exercise jurisdiction." Letter from H. R. Longhurst to
Richard N. Clattenburg, July 31, 1967.
94. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 549
(1940); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 558, 562 (D.
Del. 1963); Tar Asphalt Trucking Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 611,
615 (D.N.J. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 596 (1963); Palmer Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 179 F. Supp. 629, 633-634 (D. Mass. 1959).

An analysis of Appliances, Methods, and Systems Intended to
Promote Safety of Railroad Operation reveals that the scope of the
investigation involved therein was to determine the need for automatic block, automatic train stop or train control systems, and
automatic cab signal systems. Nowhere in the report of the investigation is flagging protection mentioned. It only appears in the
order as a permissive requirement to allow certain movements
in manual block territory where railroads are operating in excess
of 50 m.p.h 5 Nor can it be argued that these are the only circumstances under which the I.C.C. believes flagging is necessary. Certainly in operations at less than 50 m.p.h. where only train orders
and timetables are in use, flagging is a must. However, the I.C.C.
has not required its use under these circumstances.98
The D.O.T. has recognized the need for flag protection. Railroad Accident Report No. 4105, 97 prepared April 18, 1967, clearly
indicates the D.O.T. feeling concerning flag protection and the lack
of D.O.T. entry into the field. A train was permitted to enter an
occupied manual block on a clear signal rather than a caution
aspect. It struck the rear of a standing train in spite of the fact
that even with a clear block it should have been prepared to stop
short of a train, engine, or obstruction. Relative to flagging, the
Department said:
The investigation disclosed that . . . the flagman was
required by Rule 99 to provide protection against following trains. It also disclosed that under the carrier's interpretation of Rule 99, the flagman was not required to leave
the caboose to provide such protection.9
The Department further said:
[H]e [the flagman] provided protection for his train in
accordance with the carrier's interpretation of Rule 99.
However, it is evident that such protection was inadequate
to insure full protection, as prescribed by Rule 99, and
had the flagman afforded protection to the rear of his train
in accordance with provisions of that rule, instead of the
carrier's interpretation thereof, the accident would probably have been avoided. In view of the circumstances involved in this accident, the carrier evidently should consider rescinding its interpretation of Rule 99 if adequate
flagging protection is to be provided for a train stopped
95. 268 I.C.C. 547, 560 (1947).
96. See Ex Parte No. 171, 278 I.C.C. 267 (1950); Appliances, Methods,
and Systems Intended to Promote Safety of Railroad Operation, 268 I.C.C.
547 (1947); Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Systems,
Devices and Appliances, 49 C.F.R. §§ 236.0-236.838 (1968).
97. D.O.T., Railroad Accident Investigation Report No. 4105, Apr. 18,
1967. This report was made not in connection with section 25 relative to
signals but pursuant to Act of May 6, 1910, 45 U.S.C. 40, which authorizes
the I.C.C. to investigate all railroad accidents and make such recommendations as it deems proper.
98. D.O.T., Railroad Accident Investigation Report No. 4105 at 4,
Apr. 18, 1967.
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under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by
another train.99
This accident was caused at least in part by the exact interpretation of "Rule 99" which gave rise to the Bessemer case. The
D.O.T. did not suggest that any of its rules or regulations were
violated, but merely recommended that the carrier involved adopt
an interpretation of "Rule 99" similar to the one promulgated by
the P.U.C. The recommendations of this report are consistent with
the fact, admitted by the Pennsylvania court, that neither the
I.C.C. nor the D.O.T. has ever issued any blanket regulation pursuant to section 25 covering flagging protection. In twenty-eight
pages of rules and regulations issued pursuant to section 25, nothing
appears covering flagging. 100
The foregoing has indicated that flagging is not one of the
appliances, methods, and systems intended to be included within
I.C.C. authority under the general clause.
However, assuming, as the Pennsylvania court decided, that the
language of section 25 is sufficiently broad to indicate the I.C.C.
has the power to require flag protection, this fact alone would not
necessarily preclude a state's right to prescribe rules. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd.,0l the United
States Supreme Court said that blanket authority granted to a
federal agency may not, in the absence of agency action, preclude a
state from regulating in the area.10 2 In that case conflict was
asserted between the National Labor Relations Act 103 and the
Labor Relations Act of the State of New York. 0 4 At times the
boards activated by these two acts pursued inconsistent policies in
applying their respective acts to petitions of foremen to organize
bargaining units. During a period of time in which the federal
board was not entertaining foremen's petitions, foremen of the
Bethlehem Steel Company applied for and received authority to
organize under the state act. Bethlehem Steel challenged the
constitutionality of the state act contending that the National
99.

Id. at 5.

100. Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Systems, Devices, and Appliances, 49 C.F.R. §§ 236.0-236.838 (1968).

101.

330 U.S. 767 (1947); see Terminal R.R. Ass'n. v. Brotherhood

of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939); Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska State Ry.

Comm'n., 297 U.S. 471 (1936); cf. Southern Pac. R.R. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761
102.
103.
U.S.C. §

(1945).
330 U.S. at 774.
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29
157 (1964).

104. N.Y. Labor Law § 700 et. seq. (McKinney 1964).

Board's jurisdiction over labor relations is exclusive of state power.
The state contended that while federal power over the subject is
paramount, it is not exclusive, and until the federal power is actually exercised as to the particular employees, state power may be
applied. In a statement concerning unused agency authority the
Supreme Court said the following:
[W] hen federal administrative regulation has been slight
under a statute which potentially allows minute and multitudinous regulation of its subject [citations omitted], or
even where extensive regulations have been made, if the
measure in question relates to what may be considered a
separable or distinct segment of the matter covered by the
federal statute and the federal agency has not acted on
that segment, the case will be treated in a manner similar to cases in which the effectiveness of federal supervision awaits federal administrative regulation. [citations
omitted.] The states are in these cases permitted 0to
use
5
their police power in the interval. [citation omitted.] 1
During the appellate litigation of the case the N.L.R.B. decided
to entertain foremens' petitions. On the basis of this ruling, the
Supreme Court decided against the authority of the state to grant
foremen's petitions. In light of the dictum in the Bethlehem Steel
case, it would seem evident that the broad language of section 25
is not alone sufficient to preclude the states from regulating flagging.
C.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Interpretationof the United
States Supreme Court Rule

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited two United States Supreme Court cases and relied on them to state the following rule:
[W] here federal language is broad enough to indicate preemption, a state law cannot escape interdiction on the
ground that it does not conflict with the federal regulation actually passed. 10
The cited rule is really only a restatement of the first two arguments advanced by the Pennsylvania court, that the language of
section 25 is broad enough to indicate pre-emption and that the
states cannot regulate in a pre-empted area even as a supplemental
force. Since there is no new substance in this argument, it is subject to the same frailties as the first two.
The majority opinion in Bessemer relied on Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. 07 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that two state statutes requiring locomotive safety equipment over
and above the requirements of the Federal Boiler Inspection Act'08
105. 330 U.S. at 774.
106. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 344,
243 A.2d 358, 360 (1968).
107. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
108. Act of Feb. 17, 1911, ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913, as amended, Mar. 4,
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were pre-empted. The Boiler Inspection Act granted the I.C.C.
sweeping authority extending to the design, the construction, and
the material of every part of the locomotive, tender, and all appurtenances. The Supreme Court decided that the federal statute was
the exclusive pronouncement on mandatory locomotive equipment.
Based on the complete coverage of the Boiler Inspection Act, the
Court felt the congressional intention to exclude states from exerting their police power was clearly manifested.
Taking into consideration the burden on interstate commerce
which would be caused by requiring different standards for locomotives throughout the states, it is easy to see why the United
States Supreme Court considered Congress' entry into the field
exclusive. Napier presented a factual situation in which the federal interest in uniformity of regulation far outweighed the right
of the states to exercise their police power. Relying on this argument the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re Complaint of Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs.10 9 distinguished
Napier from the identical factual situation present in Bessemer by
saying:
Napier has never been applied as broadly as the railroads
contend [citations omitted]; in any event it dealt, not with
a supplemental local emergency safety device, such as flagging, but with equipment attached to the locomotive which
passes through from state to state and in which the national interest in uniformity is vital and paramount. 110
It would seem that Napier has lost much of its strength as a
judcial precedent since the decision in Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit."' In that case the cement company maintained a fleet
of federally licensed vessels operating in interstate commerce. The
vessels had qualified for federal licensing after being subjected to a
rigorous and comprehensive set of federally-imposed standards and
inspections." 2 These inspections covered the boilers in use on the
vessels. After fulfilling the federal standards, the cement company was subjected to criminal proceedings under the Detroit
Smoke Abatement Code" 13 because the federally-approved boilers
did not qualify under the municipal code. In an attempt to have
1915, ch. 169, 38 Stat. 1192, as amended, June 7, 1924, ch. 355, 43 Stat. 659,
as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 22 et seq. (1964).

109. 49 N.J. 174, 229 A.2d 505 (1967).

110. Id. at 182, 229 A.2d at 509.
111. 362 U.S. 440 (1960); see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
112. 46 U.S.C. § 392 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 28, 1871,
ch. 100, § 11, 16 Stat. 443).
113.

DETROIT, MICH., SMOKE ABATEMENT CODE § 2.2A (1947).

the municipal code declared pre-empted to the extent that it was
in conflict with federally imposed requirements, the cement company was unsuccessful. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the municipal law and stated:
In the exercise of that [police] power, the states and their
instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently
with the fed14
eral government. [citations omitted.] 1
The similarity between Huron and Napier is obvious. In fact,
the dissent in Huron15 relied heavily on Napier as authority for
declaring the municipal code pre-empted. Thus, as a judicial precedent in the field of pre-emption Napier would appear somewhat
outdated.
Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.116 in which Mr. Justice Holmes issued
one of his often cited dogmatic statements concerning pre-emption:
[W]hen the United States has exercised its exclusive
powers over interstate commerce as far as to take
possession of the field, the States no more can supplement
its requirements than they can annul them."'
Statements such as this have lost much of their strength since the
coincidence doctrine which they support has become outdated." 8
That doctrine has been discarded as a mechanical formula for the
determination of pre-emption. 119 At the present time it exists as
merely one factor to be considered in ascertaining congressional
20

intent."

CONCLUSION

Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act was passed by Congress at a time when railroads were nearly universally providing
flag protection through no other regulation than their own operating rules. In 1937 when section 25 was proposed, the I.C.C. had
authority to require the installation of automatic train stop and
train control devices under the Transportation Act of 1920. Experience had shown that these sophistcated systems of protection were
not being given wide usage and that the cheaper more simple block
114. 362 U.S. at 442.
115. 362 U.S. at 449.
116. 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
117. Id. at 569.
118. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949).
119. Id. at 729. Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
The Court could not have intended to enumerate a mechanical
rule, to be applied whatever the other circumstances indicating
Congressional intent. Neither the language nor the facts of the
cases cited support an approach in such marked contrast with the
Court's decisional basis.
120. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949). See generally Anderson, State Regulation of Interstate Commerce, 61 DIcK. L. REV. 1 (1956);
A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365 (1950).
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signal system was what railroads were utilizing. The I.C.C. did not
interpret the Transportation Act of 1920 as giving it authority to
regulate this type of signaling. In passing section 25, Congress
intended no more than to extend the I.C.C. authority into the more
widely utilized system of block signals. As such Congress did not
pre-empt the field of flag protection, and the I.C.C. has not acted
under section 25 as though it ever intended to take jurisdiction of
the field.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made a superficial examination of the meaning of section 25. Instead of collectively applying
all the current tests for determining congressional intent, the court
used only the coincidence test which is the one test least adaptable to singular use. Rather than inquiring into the legislative
history, purpose, and agency interpretation of the Act, the court
merely examined the words of the statute. Without analyzing the
current cases and trends in the field of pre-emption, the court
applied two United States Supreme Court cases, the most recent of
which was decided in 1926. As a result, the Pennsylvania court
applied outdated, dogmatic principles of law. Because of these
reasons, it is submitted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred
in ruling that section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act pre-empts
121
the state's right to require flag protection.
CHAS. EDWARD S. MITCHELL

121. During the publication stages of this Note, the Supreme Court of
the United States denied the petition for certiorari filed by appellants, the
Pennsylvania P.U.C. and the Co-Operative Legislative Committee of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. Pennsylvania
P.U.C., 430 Pa. 339, 243 A.2d 358, cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Nov.
25, 1968) (No. 443 and No. 638), petition for reconsiderationfiled, U.S.L.W.
(U.S. Dec. 20, 1968) (No. 443). The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
in Bessemer leaves unsettled the conflict concerning a state's right to require supplemental flag protection since the New Jersey case, In re Complaint of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs., 49 N.J. 174,
229 A.2d 505 (1967), holding that a state has the right to require supplemental flag protection, is unaffected by the disposition of Bessemer.

